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Editor Michael G. Bridge 
Explaining Contractual Remoteness in Singapore 
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Introduction 
The Singapore Court of Appeal (the Court of Appeal) has in MFM Restaurants 
Pte Ltd v Fish & Co Restaurants Pte Ltd' rejected Lord Hoffinann's assumption 
of responsibility test (articulated in The Achilleas2) to determine whether damages 
are too remote in a contractual claim. The Court of Appeal, however, retained 
assumption of responsibility as a concept to explain the orthodox test for remoteness 
as embodied in Hadley v Ba~endale.~ To that extent, it expressly accepted Lord 
Hoffinann's approach in The Achilleas in so far as the concept of assumption of 
responsibility is already incorporated or embodied in both limbs of the Hadley 
test.4 Two questions arise fiom this decision and form the scope of this comment. 
First, what is the actual disagreement between the Court of Appeal's more 
"orthodoxn5 approach, and Lord Hoffmann's approach? Secondly-depending on 
the answer to the first question-can "assumption of responsibility" as a concept 
justify the Hadley test without it being the test in fact? If the scope of disagreement 
between the Court of Appeal and Lord Hoffmann is less than fundamental, and 
assumption of responsibility as a concept can explain the existing orthodox test 
without subverting it, then the approach adopted by the Court of Appeal may well 
give effect to Lord Hoffmann's approach in The Achilleas in a more practically 
feasible way. 
Rejection of assumption of responsibility test 
Before dealing with these questions, it may be useful to fxst understand the 
background of the decision at hand. MFMRestaumnts concerned the assessment 
of damages arising from the breach of a settlement deed between MFM and Fish 
' MFMRestaurants Pte LtdvFish & Co Restaurants Pte Ltd [2010] SGCA 36 (MFM Restaurants). Andrew Phang 
J.A. delivered the judgment for a unanimous court comprising also Chao Hick Tin and V.K. Rajah J.T.A. 
Transfield Shipping Inc v Mercator Shipping Inc (The Achilleas) [2009] 1 A.C. 61 HL. 
 adl ley v Baxendale (1854) 9 Ex. 341. In doing so, the court preferred the orthodox two-limb test (which it had 
endorsed most recently in Robertson Quay Investment Pte Ltd v Steen Consultants Pte Ltd [2008] 2 S.L.R.(R.) 623; 
see Goh Yihan, "Robertson Quay Investment Pte Ltd v Steen Consultants Pte Ltd" (2009) 9 O.U.C.L.J. 101) to 
determine whether damages are too remote in contxact. 
4 M F ~ ~ e s t a u r a n t s  [2010] SGCA 36 at [140]. 
5The court does not actually use this term to describe its approach but other commentators have used this to describe 
the approach under Hadley: see, e.g. Lord Hofhann, "The Achilleas: custom and practice or foreseeability?" (2010) 
14 Edin. L.R. 47,50. 
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& Co. Both parties were (and are still) operators of separate chains of seafood 
restaurants in Singapore. The settlement deed had arisen out of a prior dispute. 
Fish & Co previously employed one Dickson Low, the second appellant, in the 
present appeal. Dickson subsequently left Fish & Co to join MFM. However, he 
was alleged to have breached certain aspects of his employment contract with Fish 
& Co by helping MFM set up its restaurants and divulging confidential information 
to MFM. Fish & Co eventually entered into the aforementioned settlement deed 
with Dickson and MFM in respect of those alleged breaches. The present appeal 
concerned the assessment of damages horn MFM's breaches of this settlement 
agreement. Fish & Co claimed damages during the time the breaches occurred, 
and also after the breaches had ceased. The latter period gave rise to the question 
of whether the losses suffered then were too remote. This in turn required the Court 
of Appeal to consider the applicable law to ascertain the remoteness of damages 
in contract, particularly in light of the House of  Lords' recent decision in The 
Achilleas. 
In holding that the post-breach losses were not too remote, the Court of Appeal 
reaffirmed the applicability of the two-limb test in Hadley, which it had only 
recently end~rsed.~ It held that it was "illogical" to expect losses to stop immediately 
after the breaches had ceasede7 MFM was therefore liable for these post-breach 
losses. The damages to be awarded would fall within the first limb of the test in 
Hadley, as those arising naturally according to the usual course of things as a result 
of the breaches. In the course of reaffirming Hadley, the Court of Appeal had to 
deal with Lord Hoffinann's assumption of responsibility test in The Achilleas. In 
this regard, it rejected Lord Hofhann's assumption of responsibility test in four 
clear steps. 
First, the Court of Appeal alluded to the difficulties of the assumption of 
responsibility test itself: (1) the test was (arguably8) not part of the ratio decidendi 
of The Achilleas9; (2) the test suffered hom various conceptual and theoretical 
difficulties by nullifying the role of remoteness role as an external inhibitor of 
damages claimablelo; and (3) the test was uncertain in its application since it was 
difficult to ascertain accurately what contracting parties-who most likely 
contemplated performance and not breach-were assuming responsibility for in 
the event of breach." More broadly, the Court of Appeal opined that the assumption 
of responsibility test was an attempt at reducing remoteness (and other concepts 
of contract law) to the singular concept of interpretation. While there is much to 
be said about universal conceptualisation, this particular attempt may well be too 
abstract.I2 This would, in turn, contribute to the uncertainty in the application of 
the assumptjon of responsibility test. 
Secondly, having pointed out the difficulties with the assumption of responsibility 
test, the Court of Appeal explained why the two-limb Hadley test ought to be 
preferred (and hence retained). This it proceeded by way of four sub-points: (1) 
the two limbs of the test in Hadley already embody the concept of assumption of 
In Robertson Quay [2008] 2 S.L.R.(R.) 623. 
7 ~ ~ ~ e s t a u r a n t s  [2010] SGCA 36 at [143]. 
cf. Paul C.K. Wee, "Contractual Interpretation and Remoteness" [2010] L.M.C.L.Q. 150,157 
9 ~ ~ ~ e s t a u r a n t s  [2010] SGCA 36 at [90]-[91]. 
10 MFMRestaurants [2010] SGCA 36 at [92]-[93]. 
MFMRestaurantx [2010] SGCA 36 at [94]-[97]. 
12MF~~estaurants  [2010] SGCA 36 at [98]. 
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responsibility, and justifiably so by the different degrees of knowledge required 
under each limbt3; (2) the test in Hadley is consistent with both logic and the idea 
of agreement; it is consistent as it gives effect to what the parties would have 
intended depending on the different degree of knowledge requiredi4; (3) the test 
in Hadley avoids the problems with the assumption of responsibility test, principally 
that of uncertaintyLs; and (4) the test in Hadley provides the necessary framework 
for analysis and, ultimately, to achieve justice and fairness practically in an instant 
case.I6 
Thirdly, the Court of Appeal demonstrated that applying the test in Padley to 
The Achilleas would have yielded the same result reached by the House of Lords. 
The broader point here is that "the principles in Hadley may well be sufficient to 
achieve justice in the case at hand without the need for a further (and artificial) 
construct of an assumption of respon~ibility".'~ To further substantiate its point, 
the Court of Appeal then pointed out that the assumption of responsibility test had 
been subject to much academic criticism, apparently much more than is the norm, 
for similar problems already identified by the Court of Appeal." 
Fourthly, the Court of Appeal looked at developments aRer The Achilleas and 
concluded that none of these justified the "assumption of responsibility" test or 
offered a better alternative.I9 
In the circumstances, the Court of Appeal held that: 
"[Wle . . . confirm the approach relating to remoteness of damage in the law 
of contract as set out in the decision of this court in Robertson Quay (which 
affirmed the principles laid down in Hadley). We also take this opportunity 
to state that the approach advocated by Lord Hofhann in The Achilleas .is 
not the law in Singapore, except to the extent that the learned law lord's 
reliance on the concept of assumption of responsibility by the defendant is 
already incorporated or embodied in both limbs in Hadley itself."20 
What is the difference between the Court of Appeal's approach 
and Lord Hoffmann's approach? 
It can be seen from the above that the Court of Appeal set out to reject Lord 
Hoffmann's assumption of responsibility test in a most comprehensive fashion. 
Despite this, it may be that the difference between the Court of Appeal's approach 
and Lord Hofhann's approach is not fundamentally distinct. Rather, the difference 
seems to be how to give effect to the concept of assumption of responsibility. A 
few points may be made to support this proposition. 
1 3 ~ ~ ~ e s t a u r a n t s  [2010] SGCA 36 at [loll-[107]. 
l4 MFMRestaurants [2010] SGCA 36 at [108]-[109]. 
15MF~~estaurants  [2010] SGCA 36 at [110]. 
' 6MF~~es tau ran t s  [2010] SGCA36 at [111]-[113]. 
i7MF~~esiaurants  [2010] SGCA 36 at [116]. 
la  MFMRestaurants [2010] SGCA 36 at [117]. 
'9MF~~estaurants  [2010] SGCA 36 at [121]-[133]. 
20MF~~estaurants  [2010] SGCA 36 at [140]. 
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The continued relevance of assumption of responsibility 
The first point is that assumption of responsibility as a concept is still relevant in 
Singapore for the determination of remoteness in contract law. It is important to 
be clear as to what was rejected in MFMRestaurants: assumption of responsibility 
as an independent criterion for ascertaining remoteness was rejected, not assumption 
of responsibility as a concept. Thus, in so far as assumption of responsibility-as 
a concept-is embodied within the two limbs of Hadley, that is still good law in 
Singapore. The difference between the Court of Appeal's approach and Lord 
Hoffinann's approach is not with the acceptability of this concept in explaining 
remoteness, but with how to give effect to it. Whereas Lord Hoffmann in The 
Achilleas would give effect to this concept by elevating it to the status of an 
independent legal criterion (to be determined by interpreting the contract), the 
Court of Appeal merely acknowledged assumption of responsibility as a concept 
embodied within the two limbs of Hadley. For the Court of Appeal, therefore, 
when either limb of the Hadley test is satisfied, the parties are taken to have 
assumed responsibility for the losses suffered and the losses are thus not too remote. 
However, for Lord Hoffmann, the Hadley test may be necessary (to the extent that 
"foreseeability of damage" is applicable towards interpreting the contract") but is 
otherwise insufficient to determine whether the parties had assumed responsibility 
for the losses suffered. More than foreseeability of damage (as well as other criteria 
from the Hadley test) must be proved; the process involves a wholesale 
interpretation of the contract. Put another way, assumption of responsibility ceased 
to be merely justificatory for Lord Hoffinann in The Achilleas; it had also become 
the test to determine remoteness. 
Seen in this light, both the Court of Appeal and Lord Hoffmann are actually 
agreed as to the theoretical understanding of remoteness: damages are not too 
remote where parties have assumed responsibility for them." The difference, as 
already mentioned, is how to give effect to this explanation. One possible way of 
characterising this difference might be to say that the Court of Appeal's approach 
is "external" whereas Lord Hoffmann's approach is ':internal", the two labels 
referencing the degree of importance the law places on'the parties' intentions. 
To elaborate, the Court of Appeal would rely on the two limbs in Hadley and 
focus on the degree of knowledge attributable or known to the defendant. Where 
the requisite degree of knowledge has been reached, the Court of Appeal would 
objectively impute to the defendant the obligation to compensate on the basis that 
it had assumed responsibility for the type of damage in q~estion.'~ In this way, the 
Hadley tist operates "externally7' as a default rule to impute assumption of 
responsibility based on a single criterion, namely knowledge. In contrast, Lord 
Hoffinann's approach focuses on the objectively ascertained intentions of the 
Parties. This goes beyond looking merely at knowledge, as is required, inter alia, 
under the Hadley test. This involves an interpretation of the entire contract to 
determine if the defendant had indeed assumed responsibility for the type of damage 
21 
22 
Lord Hoffinann, "The Achilleas" (2010) 14 Edin. L.R. 47,52-53. 
Thus accepting the thesis in Adam Kramer, "An Agreement-Centred Approach to Remoteness and Contract 
Damages" in Nili Cohen and Ewan McKendrick (eds), Comparative Remediesfor Breach of Contract (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2005), Ch.12, p.249. 
23 ~ ~ ~ ~ e s t a u r a n t s  [20101 SGCA 36 at [107]. 
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in question. In this sense, the approach is "internal" in so far as it focuses on the 
parties' intentions solely. It does this without recourse to any external test that 
bridges the gap between, for example, knowledge and actual assumption of 
responsibility. There are, however, two problems with characterising Lord 
Hoffmann's approach as being "internal". 
Lord Hofiann b approach envisages an external presumption 
The first is that Lord Hoffmann's approach envisages a presum~tion which is 
applied externally, independent of the parties' intentions. In The Achilleas, Lord 
Hoffmann framed his approach as follows: 
"The case therefore raises a fundamental point of principle in the law of 
contractual damages: is the rule that a party may recover losses which were 
foreseeable ('not unlikely') an external rule of law, imposed upon the parties 
to every contract in default of express provision to the contrary, or is it a 
prima facie assumption about what the parties may be taken to have intended, 
no doubt applicable in the great majority of cases but capable of rebuttal in 
cases in which the context, surrounding circumstances or general 
understanding in the relevant market shows that a party would not reasonably 
have been regarded as assuming responsibility for such losses?"24 
It has been perceptively pointed out that Lord Hoffmann had actually advocated 
a "soft" version of the assumption of responsibility test. This means that Lord 
Hoffmann has in place a default rule in the event that the parties' intentions do not 
provide an answer to whether they had assumed resp~nsibility.~~ If this is correct, 
then there is no real "external-internal" distinction between the Court of Appeal's 
approach and Lord Hoffmann's approach. As a presumption capable of rebuttal, 
Lord Hoffmann's approach nonetheless envisages an external standard which 
bridges the gap between the requisite degree of foreseeability (i.e. "not unlikely") 
and assumption of responsibility. Where that presumption applies in the absence 
of any indication of actual assumption or non-assumption of responsibility, then 
it operates similarly with the Hadley test by attributing assumption of responsibility 
to the defendant on the ,basis of some pre-defined criterion, in this case, 
foreseeability of damage. 
The limited reach of interpretation as an umbrella concept 
The second problem concerns the use of "interpretation" as an umbrella concept 
to ascertain whether the parties had assumed responsibility for particular types of 
damages. By adopting interpretation as a tool to determine whether parties had 
assumed responsibility for a particular type of damage, Lord Hoffmann's approach 
seems to be "internal" in that it relies solely on the parties' intentions. The problem 
is that the ascertainment of intentions under English law is an objective exercise.26 
There is here an external rule of law that mandates that the search for intentions 
2 4 ~ e  ~ c h i l ~ e a s  [2009] 1 A.C. 61 at [9]. 
25 Wee, "Contractual Interpretation and Remoteness" [2010] L.M.C.L.Q. 150, 168. 
2 6 ~ ~ r d ~ o £ f m a n n ,  "The Achilleas" (2010) 14 Edin. L.R. 47,60. 
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via contractual interpretation be objective.27 The significance of this is that there 
is an artificial restraint on what can be used to ascertain the parties' intentions. By 
asking what a reasonable person would have assumed responsibility for, the law 
turns to similar indicia of intentions as under the Hadley test, i.e. laowledge, 
foreseeability, etc. This is a point we take up fixther below.28 
A broader poinV9 relates to the limited reach of "interpretation" as an umbrella 
concept explaining most of contract law. The Court of Appeal in MFMRestaurants 
rejected Lord Hoffmann's use of "interpretation" as a technique to determine 
whether parties had assumed responsibility for particular types of damages. With 
respect, this must be correct. To do otherwise would be to bring "interpretation" 
past its proper function of ascertaining the objective intentions of parties to imputing 
intentions to the parties. Contract law, quite obviously, does in certain cases impute 
intentions to the parties. However, where it does so, it must not be done under the 
guise of "interpretation". That would distort the'hction and purpose of contractual 
interpretation. And that is the danger with seeking to reduce everything in contract 
to the umbrella concept of interpretation. Indeed, while language is open to varying 
degrees of interpretation, it is not infinitely malleable and cannot be given whatever 
meaning the judge desires. The danger with using "interpretation" as a technique 
to ascertain whether parties had assumed responsibility for certain types of damages 
is to expose the judge to the dangers of judicial imputation of intention. 
This is especially so given the artificiality of expecting the parties to have 
contemplated the assumption of responsibility in the event of a breach, when 
performance would have been at the forefront of their  contemplation^.^^ This 
problem is exacerbated by the rule in English law that pre-contractual negotiations 
are inadmissible towards interpreting the contract, most recently affirmed by the 
House of Lords in Chartbrook v Persimmon  home^.^' It is legitimate to think that 
if contracting parties do contemplate how to allocate risks and responsibilities in 
the event of breach, this would most clearly come out in the course of negotiations. 
The inadmissibility of prior negotiations therefore handicaps the ascertainment of 
assumption of responsibility in a remoteness inquiry. The inability to consider 
prior negotiations, among others, means that to util@e "interpretation"-hitherto 
used as a shorthand to describe the objective ascertainment of the parties' intentions 
through the language of the contract-as a technique to "find" such assumption 
of responsibility may be to take "interpretation" far beyond the safety limits of its 
27 See also MFMRestaurants [2010] SGCA 36 at [ I l l ] :  
"Any* approach is necessarily a claim to universal applicability Loolted at in this light, even the approach 
advocated by Lord Hoffiann in The Achilleas is, notwithstanding its focus on the actual intentions of the parties 
themselves, necessari[y itselfa universal and external rule of law - albeit one (which we have explained above) 
28 
that engenders excessive and unnecessary uncertainty." (Emphasis in original.) 
See Harvey McGregor QC, McGregor on Damages, 18th edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2009), para 6171, 
who writes that it is the subjective intention that ought to be relevant: 
"What Lord Hoffmam and Lord Hope propose is full of difficulty, uncertainty and impracticality. How are we 
to tell what subjectively the contracting parties were thinking about assumption of responsibility? When 
contracting, assumption of responsibility was probably not in their minds at all, for it is well known that parties 
entering a contract are thinking of its performance rather than of its breach. Apart from this uncertainty there is 
the impracticality of allowing defendants to raise the issue, as they will surely do, in case after case as an extra 
argument, thereby taking up the time of the courts unnecessarily and making the amving at settlements more 
29 
difficult." (Emphasis added.) 
30 
Not necessarily related to whether Lord Hofiinann's approach is an "external" one. 
See also Andrew Robertson, "The basis of the remoteness rule in contract" (2008) 28 Legal Studies 172, 185. 
Chartbrook v Persimmon Homes [2009] 3 W.L.R. 267 HL. 
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original purpose. It is far better, as the Court of Appeal said, to focus on the parties' 
knowledge, and then to impute to the defendant the requisite assumption of 
responsibility that then justifies his or her being liable for the damage concerned. 
Can "assumption of responsibility" explain the test in Hadley 
without being the actual test? 
From the above, we see that the difference between the Court of Appeal's approach 
and Lord Hoffmann's approach lies not in the theoretical justification behind 
remoteness, but in how to give effect to it. Even then, we obse'rve that both 
approaches are external in that they rely on an outside standard to bridge the 
available indicia of the parties' intentions and assumption of responsibility. For 
the Court of Appeal, the standard is the requisite degree of knowledge under 
Hadley. For Lord Hoffmann, the standard is foreseeability of damage, but this may 
be rebutted via an interpretation of the contract. However, it can be argued that 
even when one interprets the contract, owing to the objective approach under 
English law, one is still applying an external standard which artificially restricts 
the facts which may be admissible to ascertain the parties' intentions. To that 
extent, therefore, under both approaches, any assumption of responsibility is not 
only justificatory of remoteness, it is also imputed by the court. Thus assumption 
of responsibility operates similarly under both approaches: it serves merely a 
justificatory role, without being the actual determinant of whether damages are 
reco~erable.~~ 
Once it is realised that even under Lord Hoffmann's approach there is no actual 
ascertainment of the parties' intentions, then any difference between the Court of 
Appeal's approach and Lord Hoffmann's approach all but disappears. In both 
approaches, the important question is how to bridge the gap between the facts and 
the theoretical justification of assumption of responsibility. In neither case does 
the court find an actual assumption of responsibility (quite unlike what a "strong" 
version of Lord Hoffinann's approach would entaiP3). It is imputed, or at best, 
implied, in both cases. The practical issue becomes deciding the relevant factors 
that the courts should look at in order to impute assumption of responsibility to 
the parties. 
For the Court of Appeal, howledge under the Hadley test is sufficient. It offered 
the following explanation: 
"Looked at in this light, it is our view that the criterion of knowledgefirnishes 
a suficiently objective basis on which topremise the existence (or otherwise) 
of an implied obligation or assumption of responsibility on the defendant. To 
leave the situation open to other factors would lead to unnecessary speculation 
as well as uncertainty." (Emphasis in original.)34 
For Lord Hoffmann, the criteria embodied with the Hadley test are insufficient. 
Writing extra-judicially, he has said: 
32 If there were an express assumption of responsibility, this would likely form part of the express terms of the 
contract: see also MFMRestaurants [2010] SGCA 36 at [119]. 
33 See Wee, "Contractual Interpretation and Remoteness" [2010] L.M.C.L.Q. 150, 168. 
34 M F ~ ~ e s t a u r a n t s  [2010] SGCA 36 at [107]. 
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"The orthodox approach produces a high degree of indeterminacy because it 
relies on only two concepts: kind of loss and degree of probability. But the 
cases show that these are open to very considerable manipulation to achieve 
what the court considers to be a fair result."35 
It is interesting that the Court of Appeal and Lord Hoffmann each extracted different 
concepts from the Hadley test. The Court of Appeal had in the earlier case of 
Robertson Quay Investment Pte Ltd v Steen Consultants Pte Ltd (Robertson 
not seen the point in embarking on an exegesis of the precise degree of probability 
required to satisfy the threshold of "reasonable contemplation" in the Hadley test 
as to do so would be to engage in "semantic hair~plitting".~~ Instead, it focused 
almost exclusively on the requisite knowledge under the Hadley test, deeming that 
sufficient to impute an assumption of responsibility for the damage concerned. On 
the other hand, the failure of the courts to decide on the precise degree of probability 
presented a problem for Lord Hoffinann. He would therefore look to other indicia 
of parties' intentions; in fact, those relevant towards interpreting the contract. 
Which approach is preferable: the singular criterion preferred by the Court of 
Appeal, or the multi-factorial approach preferred by Lord Hoffinann? 
It is suggested that the Court of Appeal's approach is preferable for the primary 
reason of certainty. If the Court of Appeal's approach already embodies the concept 
of assumption of responsibility as justification for remoteness, then, theoretically 
at least, it is identical with Lord Hoffinann's approach. The remaining issue, as 
already discussed, is how to give effect to this concept. The Court of Appeal's 
approach, using the existing Hadley test, provides a degree of familiarity that 
engenders certainty. It also focuses on knowledge, which is a far more ascertainable 
criterion compared with the degree of foreseeability necessary. Indeed, as the Court 
of Appeal said, the existing tests in Hadley are no more indeterminate than those 
based on the concept of assumption of re~ponsibility.~' This also avoids stretching 
the language of the contract to breaking point by trying to find an assumption of 
responsibility. 
Conclusion 
In practical terms, however, the continued retention of assumption of responsibility 
as a concept by the Court of Appeal is unlikely to cause much disquiet. At the end 
of the day, the applicable test in Singapore to determine whether damages are too 
remote in contract remains, quite fmly ,  the two-limb test in Hadley. The practical 
means of satisfying the two limbs will remain the state of knowledge on the part 
of the defendant. "Assumption of responsibility" remains in the background as a 
theoretical justification for the continued retention of the two limbs, and does not 
operate as a practical mean of satisfying either of the limbs. 
In essence, the Court of Appeal's approach, while seemingly grounded in 
orthodoxy, may be seen as a deliberately incremental approach towards a more 
coherent understanding of the remoteness principles. The Court of Appeal in MFM 
Restaurants (and also earlier in Robertson Quay) has explained the basis of the 
35 Lord Hoffinann, "The Achilleas: custom and practice or foreseeability?" (2010) 14 Edin. L.R. 47 at 52. 
36~obertson Quay [2008] 2 S.L.R.(R.) 623. 
37~obertson Quay [ZOO81 2 S.L.R.(R.) 623 at [60]. 
'' ~ ~ ~ e s t a u r a n t s  [2010] SGCA 36 at [138]. 
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two limbs in Hadley by way of an implicit (and imputed) agreement as to risk and 
responsibility inherent in those limbs. The Court of Appeal's approach, in the form 
of a justification for the existing rule rather than a new approach derived Gom 
such a justification, is preferable to the assumption of responsibility test in The 
Achilleas. As already pointed out by the Court of Appeal, this, first and foremost, 
avoids the uncertainty that is generated by the assumption of responsibility test. 
This is important in commercial matters. Moreover, in so doing, the Court of 
Appeal has not sacrificed conceptual coherence for convenience in so far as it 
related remoteness with implicit agreement as to risk and responpibility. This 
thereby achieves what Lord Hoffinann sought to do in The Achilleas, but with 
more certainty. 
Yihan Goh 
Faculty of l aw ,  National University of Singapore 
